The Battle of Midway (Japanese: ミッドウェー ^[4] ) Yes United States Navy The famous battle of more with less. The Battle of Midway was fought The year 1942 Launched on 4 June, the battle was successfully repulsed by the United States Navy Japanese navy The attack on Midway Atoll resulted in a major naval defeat for the Japanese. ^[1]

Midway Islands With an area of only 4.7 square kilometers, its special geographical position determines the importance of its strategic position. Island distance America San Francisco and Japan Yokohama They are 2,800 nautical miles apart, midway on the Pacific Sea route between Asia and North America, hence the name Midway Island. From the Pearl Harbor 1,135 nautical miles is important for the United States in the Central Pacific region Military base And transportation hub, also the US military in Hawaii Gateways and outposts. Lost Midway, home of the American Pacific Fleet Pearl Harbor It won't be safe.

In the end, the United States lost an aircraft carrier Uss Yorktown The cost of sinking Japan The aircraft carrier Dragon , The aircraft carrier Soryu , The aircraft carrier Akagi , The aircraft carrier USS Kaga Four heavy workhorses Aircraft carrier . The victory in the battle was deeply encouraged Anti-fascist alliance The morale of the country has been turned around Pacific War Victory of the situation.

Given name: Battle of Midway
Occurrence time: June 4, 1942 - June 7, 1942
Ground point: Waters off Midway Island
combatant: Imperial Japanese Navy , United States Pacific Fleet
Bear fruit: The Americans won a decisive victory
Combatant strength: Aircraft carrier : Japanese 4, American 3
Various types of ships: US 7, Japan 25
Types of aircraft: 264 aircraft in Japan, 230 aircraft in the United States Carrier-based aircraft +172 land-based aircraft

casualty: Japanese army : 4 aircraft carriers, The heavy cruiser The sinking of the Mikuma, 332 military aircraft (including spare aircraft)
Japanese dead: 3,057 killed, including 110 airmen
Us military: Aircraft carrier "Yorktown", destroyer Harman sank, 98 military aircraft
Us army Killed: 307 killed, including 172 airmen
Chief commander: Isoroku Yamamoto , Chester William Nimitz
Forward commander: Tadaichi Minamo , Raymond Ames Spruance , Frank Jack Fletcher
Foreign name: Battle of Midway

catalogue

War background

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EDITOR

War years

The Battle of Midway began on June 4, 1942 ^[2] . United States Navy Not only was this battle successfully repelled Japanese navy The attack on the midway atoll also gained the initiative in the Pacific theater, so this battle can be described as a turning point in the Pacific theater.

Battle of Midway

Imperial Japan in Battle of the Coral Sea It's been done before Midway Islands Planned as the next target. It's more than revenge United States Air Force Air attack Tokyo (At that time, some senior Japanese generals believed that the aircraft attacking Tokyo took off from Midway Island), and it could be opened Hawaiian Islands The gate. To prevent American forces from attacking Japan from Hawaii. The Japanese Navy would like to take this opportunity to United States Pacific Fleet The remaining warships were lured to Midway Island and wiped out. In order to achieve this goal, the Japanese navy was almost full, devoting more than half of its forces, and the size of the fleet even exceeded the largest naval battle in history Naval Battle of Leyte Gulf of Combined fleet . It was the largest strategic offensive by the Japanese Navy in World War II, however Battle of the Coral Sea Two ships short of the combined fleet Aircraft carrier Namely, the injured "Xianghe" and the "Ruihe", which are short of pilots, have a very serious impact on the operation.

If the Japanese navy achieves its goals, then West coast Would be directly threatened by the Japanese navy. As the rest of the US Navy ships have been deployed to North Atlantic The United States would not be able to effectively counter the Japanese navy in the Pacific any time soon. Japan is well aware of America's military potential. Once the vast industrial capacity of the United States was fully integrated into the war orbit, Japan had little hope of winning. Therefore, Japan hopes to force the United States to sit at the negotiating table before this situation occurs, and quickly end the war with the United States.

Preparation for a campaign

Battle warm-up: Bombing Tokyo and the Coral Sea Battle

Pearl Harbor attack When President Roosevelt decided to replace Kimmel with Chester Nimitz as commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, he told Nimitz, "Go to Pearl Harbor and clean up the mess and stay there until the war is won." When Nimitz arrived, he quickly organized only four ships Aircraft carrier And a fleet of escorts. The fleet attacked in the middle Pacific islands On the Japanese army, then the implementation of a shocking battle plan - bombing Tokyo .

On April 18, 1942, 16 B25 bombers from the aircraft carrier USS Hornet flew over Tokyo, dropped bombs and incendiary bombs, and flew downwind to China. This air raid shook the Japanese government and the opposition, but also stimulated Yamamoto, making him more determined to attack Midway Island. On April 28, Yamamoto's flagship" Yamato A meeting of senior naval officers was held on board the giant battleship, and a specific battle plan for the attack on Midway was determined: first, a fleet was sent to attack the Aleutian Islands Attu Cay Landing on Kiska Island, as a decoy, drew the attention of the American fleet to the north, and then sent Nakayoshi to command the main fleet to seize Midway Island. The date of operation is tentatively set for early June. On May 5, the Japanese Naval Command issued the Headquarters Admiralty Order No. 18, which officially approved the operation plan for Midway Island and was named Operation Mi.

While Yamamoto was planning the operation, the Battle of the Coral Sea broke out on May 7, 1942, the first major engagement of aircraft carriers in human history. The Japanese fleet attacked Moresby in the first step towards the occupation of Australia. New Guinea Capital) port, encounter on the way Frank Fletcher Two American aircraft carriers under the command of Major General." Yorktown "And" The Lexington The two carriers are escorted by seven cruisers. The United States sank the Japanese aircraft carrier "Shiong Fung", severely damaged. Flying Crane "But lost" The Lexington "And" Yorktown "Also hit hard. The battle of the Coral Sea was decisive in preventing a Japanese invasion of Australia, but it also strengthened Yamamoto's resolve to conquer Midway Island, where he wanted to establish an airfield as a base from which to attack all ships coming from the United States. Yamamoto analyzed his strategy and tactics from every Angle. First, stay away Alaska The Aleutian Islands, controlled by the United States, launched a diversionary attack, hoping to distract the entire American fleet from Midway. However, the United States managed to intercept communications between senior Japanese commanders and discovered Yamamoto's plans, so Nimitz decided to take no action against the Aleutians and instead sent three aircraft carriers and eight cruisers to Midway.

Intelligence work

In close cooperation with British and Dutch counterparts, the US Naval Intelligence "Magic" team began to successfully decode parts of the Japanese Navy's main communications system, JN-25. By early May, the Allies had made a major breakthrough in breaking JN-25, and thus gained the ability to spy on Japanese naval plans. JN-25 let the Allies know that the AF position would be the next target for the Japanese Navy, but the Allies were unable to crack the AF position. The Hawaii Intelligence Station, led by Major Joseph Rochford, believed that the "AF position" was Midway Island, but Washington Naval Intelligence insisted that it was The Aleutian Islands . However, no matter how advanced the decoding technology of the coalition forces is, it is still unable to crack the correct location of the AF azimuth. While the top brass of the U.S. military was vexing, Rochford and his intelligence team members went through a mountain of former cables. Rochford, who had a good memory, found a Japanese telegram from early 1942 in a sea of messages, asking for seaplanes to fly from The Marshall Islands Take off for Pearl Harbor The cable also mentions taking care to avoid aerial reconnaissance from AF... According to the map, AF can only be Midway Islands . And Jasper Helms, an analyst at the Hawaii Intelligence Station, came up with a clever way to determine if AF location was Midway. He asked for Midway Naval base The commandant radioed to Pearl Harbor that there was a problem with the desalination equipment on Midway Island, causing the entire island to run out of water. As a result, Rochford and his team intercepted and deciphered a secret message sent from the sea by Admiral Yamamoto, commander of the Combined Fleet of the Japanese Navy, to the Japanese headquarters of the Admiralty: "It is reported that 'AF' is short of fresh water. This confirmed AF position as Midway Island, the next target of the Japanese Navy attack.

Due to the time required to obtain information from JN-25, Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, was unable to obtain reliable information that could be used to ambush the Japanese fleet until the last minute. He immediately recalled his carriers in the southwest Pacific Enterprise account , Hornet And for participating in the Battle of the Coral Sea Pearl Harbor Undergoing major repairs Yorktown . appoint Raymond Spruance Major in place of the sick Halsey Lieutenant-general command Task Force 16. Nimitz is going to take three Yorktown class aircraft carriers The main force, along with about fifty support ships, lay in wait northeast of Midway to attack the Japanese fleet heading for Midway.

in Battle of the Coral Sea When the badly wounded Yorktown returned to Pearl Harbor, she appeared to be in need of several months of major repair work. After 72 hours of around-the-clock repairs (24 hours according to National Geographic at War), her flight deck was re-paved, new steel bars were installed inside, and the ship's crew was reassembled into a new fleet. Admiral Nimitz went to great lengths to violate many naval regulations in order to achieve his goal of bringing Yorktown with him. Just three days after Yorktown entered port, she miraculously joined the American warships (Task Force 17) on her final operational mission to Midway Island.

In addition to the formation of physical forces, Nimitz appointed personnel Raymond Arms Spruance Major-general replaced the one who was incapacitated by illness William Halsey Lieutenant-general command Task Force 16. Nimitz, with the main force of all available aircraft carriers at hand, plus about fifty support ships, waited northeast of Midway to ambush the Japanese fleet heading for Midway. Midway was home to about 2,100 Marines from the Sixth Garrison Battalion and about 1,500 Naval Air Station personnel, including pilots and support forces.

At the same time, the Japanese Navy took part in the Battle of the Coral Sea aircraft carriers Sweihak Waiting for a new fleet of carrier aircraft at the Truk base; wounded Flying Crane Repairs are made at the base. The battle of Midway could have turned out very differently if the Japanese Navy had not mistakenly believed that the U.S. would only send two aircraft carriers, Enterprise and Hornet, to attack Sora, Dragon, Akagi, and Kaga.

Because the Japanese mistakenly underestimated the miraculous repair capabilities of the American forces, the Japanese Navy assumed that only two American carriers, Enterprise and Hornet, could be used in combat.

Strategic plan

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EDITOR

Japan

The Japanese headquarters had decided on this stage of the campaign in the order of May 5.

The plan drawn up by the Joint Fleet Command is unusually large and detailed, but it lacks flexibility. Almost the entire strength of the Japanese Navy was devoted to the operation, which involved about 200 ships, including eight aircraft carriers, 11 battleships, 22 cruisers, 65 destroyers, and 21 submarines. The ship was assisted by more than 600 aircraft.

Master plan

For the main Midway battle, the Japanese used:

(1) An advance submarine force, divided into three lines of patrol, with the intention of neutralizing United States naval counteraction;

(2) An invasion force: under the command of Lieutenant General Kondo, 12 escorted transport ships carrying 5,000 troops, closely supported by four heavy cruisers, and a longer-range cover force consisting of two battleships, a light aircraft carrier and four additional heavy cruisers;

(3) Admiral Nagumo's first aircraft carrier force, consisting of four heavy aircraft carriers carrying more than 250 aircraft; The convoy consisted of two battleships, two heavy cruisers and a group of destroyers.

(4) The main fleet, under General Yamamoto's direct command, consisted of three battleships, plus a destroyer shield and a light aircraft carrier. One of these battleships is a recently built giant." Yamato Yamato, with a displacement of 70,000 tons and nine 460mm triple main guns, was Yamamoto's flagship.

Auxiliary program

towards Aleutian The forces assigned by the Japanese were:

(1) An invasion force consisting of three covered transport ships carrying 2,400 troops, plus a support group consisting of two heavy cruisers and a naval force consisting of two light aircraft carriers;

(2) 1 cover force: There are 4 older battleships.

America

Nimitz The admiral managed to muster only 76 ships, a third of which were in the North Pacific and never participated in the battle.

^[1]

Course of a campaign

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EDITOR

An attack

In the early morning, the first wave of Japanese attack aircraft was 36 Type 97 attack aircraft 36 aircraft The Type 99 bomber And 36 Zeros began taking off simultaneously from four aircraft carriers, and 108 carrier-based aircraft under Captain Tomonaga set out to attack Midway Island. Admiral Nagumo ordered reconnaissance aircraft to search the sea to the east and south, and a second wave of attack aircraft parked on the flight deck, ready to meet the American fleet. But heavy cruisers Ligan sign Two of our reconnaissance planes were delayed for half an hour because of a faulty catapult, Tsukimo One of the reconnaissance planes turned back midway after an engine failure (this plane was supposed to be right over the American task force), which laid the foundation for the Japanese fleet.

At dawn, a Katarina reconnaissance aircraft from Midway reported spotting the Japanese carriers, and Rear Admiral Spruance immediately responded by preparing to attack the carriers (Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher was in command of the operation, but Spruance launched the air raid first). The American fleet, having broken the communications codes of the Japanese Navy "JN-25", was well aware of the enemy's plans.

Early in the morning, Japanese carrier-based aircraft launched a fierce attack on Midway Island. American fighters stationed at Midway Island also took to the air to meet the incoming Japanese fighters. American bombers, including B-17s, fired back at the Japanese fleet.

Secondary attack

At 0700 hours, Captain Tomonaga and the first strike group prepared to return and sent a telegram to Admiral Nagumo that a second attack was needed.

At 7:06 a.m., the aircraft, torpedo With 117 aircraft and dive bombers, Task Force 16 Hornet and Enterprise under Major General Spruance set sail for Nagumo Fleet, 200 nautical miles away.

At 07:10, the first 10 U.S. torpedo bombers from Midway appeared over the Nagumo fleet. The American planes lined up and pounced on the Japanese aircraft carrier. Under the interception of the Japanese fighters and the fierce air defense power of the Japanese ships, seven were soon shot down. Tomonaga's reports and the American attacks convinced Admiral Nagumo that Midway's defenses were still strong, and he decided to divert the aircraft originally intended for use against the American ships to conduct a second bombing raid on Midway. At this point, the Japanese still did not find the American fleet.

At 07:15, Nagumo ordered Akagi and Kaga to arrive deck Take the torpedoed aircraft down to the hangar, unload the torpedoes and replace them with high-explosive shells for ground attack.

At 07:30, Nagumo received a telegram from a reconnaissance plane that had delayed liftoff by half an hour from Ligan, reporting that 10 American warships had been sighted about 240 nautical miles off Midway. Nagumo ordered the spy plane to continue to find out whether the enemy fleet had aircraft carriers, and ordered the suspension of the replacement of torpedo planes. As Nagumo waited for the results of the reconnaissance plane, the air sounded the alarm again. More than 40 American planes flying out of Midway The B-17 bomber and Dive bomber Jump on Nagumo's fleet. With no fighter escort, it was quickly repelled by Nagumo's Zero fighters.

At 8:15 a.m., Nagumo finally received a report from a reconnaissance plane that there was at least one aircraft carrier in the U.S. fleet. South cloud ordered the ships to stop loading bombs, the aircraft again returned to the hangar to refit torpedoes, the deck of the Japanese aircraft carrier was in chaos, in order to win time, unloaded bombs, are piled up in the hangar.

At 08:30, the first strike group from Midway returned to the skies over the Japanese fleet. And the fighter jets protecting the carrier need to land to refuel. Nagumo is in a dilemma. Rear Admiral Yamaguchi, commander of the second Carrier Group, advised Nagumo to "immediately order the strike force to take off." But the second group of attack planes had not yet been replaced with torpedoes, and there were not enough fighters to escort them if they attacked immediately. And the runway on the ship is occupied by taking off aircraft, so the first attack group with empty fuel tanks will fall into the sea. Nagumo decided to delay the attack, first recovering the air force and carrier escort fighters that had attacked Midway, and then reorganizing his forces to attack the American task force.

At 08:37, returning aircraft began landing on the flight decks of the four carriers in succession.

At 0840 hours, 35 fighters took off from Yorktown, the aircraft carrier of Task Force 17 under Major General Fletcher, 15 nautical miles away.

At 9:18, all aircraft were finished. Nagumo ordered the fleet to sail northeast at a speed of 30 knots, approaching the American task force to avoid the incoming Midway aircraft, and to prepare for a full attack on the American Task force.

At 09:20, fighter jets covering the Japanese fleet began to take off.

At 9:25, a convoy of 15 TBD Saboteurs took off from Hornet. Torpedo bomber (VT-8 Squadron, Commander Major John C. Waldron) spotted the Nagumo fleet. Unfortunately, they don't have fighter escorts. In the suicide attack, the clumsy torpedo plane was shot down by Zeros and anti-aircraft fire, killing all 30 pilots except Second Lieutenant George H. Gay.

At 9:30, 14 TBD Saboteurs took off from Enterprise. Torpedo bomber Following in (VT-6 Squadron, Commander Major Eugene E. Lindsey), they attacked Soryu and Winged Dragon. However, when they attacked the Nagumo fleet, they were severely damaged, losing 11 torpedo bombers, and all the torpedoes dropped by the American planes were not hit. The commanding officer, Major Lindsey, was killed in the battle.

At 9:37, after receiving a telegram from Ligon 4 at 30 "out of fuel, request to return", Major General Abe ordered her to remain where she was, she said "I can't" and was allowed to return.

At 10:00, Soryu's Type XIII reconnaissance aircraft failed to locate the American carrier, following the wrong orientation reported by Ligon IV.

At 10:10, 12 TBD Destroyer torpedo bombers (VT-3 Squadron, Commander Major Lance Massie) launched from Yorktown to attack Dragon, shielding his six F4Fs under Commander Major John Saatchi in his "Saatchi Shear" tactics against 15 Zeroes, although the results were considerable (one lost, five shot down). Ten of the 12 TBDS were shot down, and the rest were badly damaged and forced to land at sea on their return journey. The commanding officer, Major Lance Massie, was killed, and none of the five torpedoes fired at Dragon hit.

At 10:20, due to the U.S. attack, the aircraft deck began to carry out refueling and refueling operations for the escorting Zeros, unable to prepare for a counterattack wave (the latest historical data corrects the so-called fate of 5 minutes). While the Japanese fighters were busy chasing away the American torpedo planes at low altitude, 33 Dauntless dive bombers from Enterprise, led by Major Clarence McCluskey, appeared above the Nagumo fleet. When they were about to give up the search, they found the destroyer "Arashi", which stayed in place to prevent the U.S. submarine "Nautilus" from floating, and followed the destroyer to find the Japanese aircraft carrier. At this time, the Japanese ship is turning to the wind to prepare to release fighters, extremely vulnerable to attack.

At 10:24, when the first shift of anti-aircraft Japanese fighters left the flight deck, Enterprise's 33 Intrepid aircraft Dive bomber Split into two squadrons to attack separately The aircraft carrier Akagi and The aircraft carrier USS Kaga Since Enterprise's captain, Major McCluskey, was a fighter pilot by training, he was not familiar with dive bombing procedures - he was supposed to lead the lead formation to attack the far carrier instead of the near one, which caused almost all the bombers (30) to dive on Kaga, and Captain Best, in command of VB-6, realized that one carrier had not been attacked. He called back two planes to join the bombing. They completed the most beautiful bombing of the battle: three 1,000-pound bombs hit, the first and third missed, and the second bomb dropped by Best penetrated Akagi's flight deck and detonated a random pile of aerial bombs in the hangar, creating a single bomb sinking the carrier. Then the next 17 came Uss Yorktown The Intrepid dive bomber (VB-3 Squadron, Commander Major Maxwell Leslie) attacked The aircraft carrier Soryu . The three Japanese aircraft carriers suddenly became three balls of fire, stacked on the deck of the aircraft and fuel and ammunition caused a large explosion, fire into the sky, in a short five minutes, the three Japanese aircraft carriers were completely blown up.

At 10:40, he took over as commander of the Japanese 2nd Air Force, which was in charge of air operations The mountain pass is well known The Rear Admiral launched a counterattack, 18 by "99" dive bombers (commanded by Senior Captain Michio Kobayashi) and six Zero fighter Formed an attack group (commander Captain Yasuhiro Shigematsu) from The aircraft carrier Dragon Take off. Flying to the target on the way, found the returning US VB-3 bomber squadron, then quietly followed. Thus, the Japanese successfully located Yorktown and immediately launched an attack. Three bombs hit Yorktown, which was damaged, but the ship was restored to navigation by the American crew.

At 11:30, Admiral Nagumo and his staff moved to the cruiser Nagara and began assembling the remainder of the fleet.

At 13:40, ten Japanese "97" torpedo attack aircraft (commander Tomonaga Joshi) and six "Zero" fighters (commander Mori Shigeru) arrived from the Dragon and launched a second attack on the wounded Yorktown. Since Yorktown had been put out and restored to navigation, the Japanese pilots mistook her for another aircraft carrier. Yorktown was hit by two torpedoes during the second attack. Major General Fletcher was forced to transfer to the cruiser Astoria, handing over command to Major General Spruance.

At 14:45, American reconnaissance aircraft spotted the Japanese carrier Dragon, and Spruance immediately ordered Enterprise, The aircraft carrier USS Hornet Thirty Dauntless dive bombers took off to attack the Dragon.

At 15:00, Yorktown's captain Buckmaster was forced to abandon the ship. However, she did not sink, so the Americans returned to the ship and tried to be towed by tugboats to Pearl Harbor.

At 16:45, dive bombers from USS Enterprise successfully attacked the remaining Japanese Dragon. The Dragon immediately hit four bullets, and the ship was in flames.

At 19:13, Soryu and Kaga sank, with Soryu's captain, Taisaku Yanagoto, remaining on the bridge and sinking with the ship; Taisaku Okada, commander of Kaga, was killed in the American bombing.

At 20:30, Yamamoto ordered submarine I-168 to begin shelling AF airfields at 2300 hours, and informed that the Seventh Group would follow. Kurita ) Join the shelling.

At 22:50, Nagumo reported: "The enemy still has four aircraft carriers, our aircraft carriers are all destroyed."

At 2:55 PM on June 5, 1942, the commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet, General Isoroku Yamamoto, rejected the plan proposed by the chief of staff, Daisao Kurojima, to focus all the ships on bombing and landing on Midway Island in daylight, and ordered that the occupation of Midway Island be called off. "All responsibility rests with me alone," he said. "I will go back and apologize to His Majesty." He shut himself in the drawing room and refused to see his men for three days.

At 3:50, Nagumo received Yamamoto's order to "sink the Akagi".

At 0500 hours, the failed aircraft carrier Akagi was torpedoed by the Japanese destroyers Maikaze, Hagi Kaze, and Arashi, and Captain Taijiro Aoki was rescued from the ship.

At 05:10, the irretrievable aircraft carrier Dragon was torpedoed by a Japanese destroyer. Commander, 2nd Air Force The mountain pass is well known Major General and Captain Calais man Dazuo chose to sink with the ship, and some of the crew trapped in the fire to the bottom of the cabin escaped through the hole pierced by the torpedo.

On that day, the United States sent several waves of aircraft to pursue the Japanese warships, but they did not find Yamamoto's main fleet.

End of campaign

At 3:45 on 6 June 1942, two Japanese heavy cruisers were launched Topmost number While turning in heavy fog, Mikuma and Mikuma collided, severely damaging the uppermost and leaving Mikuma and two other destroyers to escort.

At 08:05, 12 Marine bombers from Midway pursued Mikuma and Suma. Mikuma was sunk, while the most severely wounded ship finally escaped the American bombing and returned Truk Base. The Americans then tried to pursue the Dragon, which had sunk a few hours earlier, but only found the destroyer Tankaze. However, neither side achieved anything.

The American task force withdrew from the battlefield.

At 1300 hours on 7 June 1942, the Japanese submarine I-168 spotted Yorktown and fired four torpedoes, two of which hit Yorktown and one of which hit the escorting destroyer Harman, which sank, and Yorktown floated until noon the next day before sinking to the bottom of the sea.

At the same time, six other U.S. destroyers attempted to counter I-168 , But I-168 was eventually evacuated safely .

The Battle of Midway was over.

Officers of both sides

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EDITOR

America

Chester Nimitz, Commander, United States Pacific Fleet (3 photos)

Commander, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Theater: Chester. Admiral William Nimitz

Carrier Task Force: Frank. Jack. Fletcher Rear admiral

Task Force 17: Rear Admiral Fletcher

Carrier Group 17.5: Elliott. Captain Buckmaster

Uss Yorktown CV-5) Colonel Buckmaster

Air Wing: Oscar. Lieutenant Commander Peterson

VF-3-25 F4F Wildcats: John. Lieutenant Commander Saatchi

VB-3-18 SBD Dauntless dive bombers: Maxwell. Lieutenant Commander Leslie

VS-3-19 SBD Dauntless dive bombers: Wallace Jr. Lieutenant Commander Short

VT-3-13 TBD Destroyer Torpedo bombers: Reims. Lieutenant Commander Massie

17.2 Cruiser Group: William. Rear Admiral Smith

Astoria CA-34) Francis. Captain Scanlan

HMS Portland CA-33) Lawrence. Captain Dubose

Destroyer Detachment 17.4: Squadron 2: Gilbert. Captain Hoover

Uss Harman DD-412) Arnold. Lieutenant Commander Truu

Uss Hughes DD-410) Oh, Donald. Lieutenant Commander Ramsey

Uss Morris DD-417) Harry. Lieutenant Commander Garrett

Uss Anderson DD-411) John. Lieutenant Commander Ginder

Uss Russell DD-414) Glenn. Lieutenant Commander Hartwig

Uss Gwynn DD-433) John. Lieutenant Commander Higgins

Task Force 16: Raymond. Rear Admiral Spruance

Carrier Group 16.5: George. Captain Murray

Uss Enterprise ( CV-6) George. Captain Murray

Air Wing: C. Wade. Lieutenant Commander McCluskey

VF-6-27 F4F Wildcats: James. Lieutenant Commander Gray

VB-6-19 SBD Dauntless dive bombers: Richard. Lieutenant Commander Best

VS-6-19 SBD Dauntless dive bombers: William. Lieutenant Commander Gallagher

VT-6-14 TBD Destroyer Torpedo bombers: Eugene. Lieutenant Commander Lindsey

The USS Hornet ( CV-8) Mark. Captain Mitchell

Air Wing: Stannup. Lieutenant Colonel Lin Hai

VF-8-27 F4F Wildcats: Samuel. Lieutenant Commander Mitchell

VB-8-19 SBD Dauntless dive bombers: Robert. Lieutenant Commander Johnson

VS-8-18 SBD Dauntless dive bombers: Walter. Lieutenant Commander Rodee

VT-8-15 TBD Destroyer Torpedo bombers: John. Lieutenant Commander Waldron

16.2 Cruiser Group: Thomas. Rear Admiral Kincaid

The heavy cruiser New Orleans CA-32) Howard. Captain Goodall

The heavy cruiser Minneapolis CA-36) Oh, Frank. Captain Lowry

Vincennes CA-44) Frederick. Captain Riefkohl

HMS Northampton CA-26) William. Captain Chandler

Uss Pensacola CA-24) Oh, Frank. Captain Lowe

Uss Atlanta CL-51) Samuel. Captain Jenkins

Destroyer Detachment 16.4: Squadron 1: Alexandria. Navy Captain Early

Uss Phelps DD-360) Edward. Lieutenant Commander Baker

Uss Walden DD-352) William. Lieutenant Commander Progue

Uss Monaghan DD-354) William. Lieutenant Commander Burford

Uss Alvin DD-355) George. Lieutenant Commander Phelan

Squadron 6: Edward. Captain Saul

Uss Bowch DD-363) Oh, Harold. Lieutenant Commander Tiemroth

Uss Coningham DD-371) Henry. Lieutenant Commander Daniel

Uss Benham DD-397) Joseph. Lieutenant Commander Worthington

Uss Ellet DD-398) Francis. Lieutenant Commander Gardner

Uss Murray DD-401) Gelzer. Lieutenant Commander SIMS

Tanker formation:

Cimarron AO-22) Oh, Russell. Lieutenant Commander Ihrig

Platte AO-24) Ralph. Captain Henkel

Uss Dewey DD-349) Lieutenant Commander C.F. Chillingworth, Jr

Uss Monson DD-436) Roland. Lieutenant Commander Smoot

Submarine Force: Pearl Harbor Submarine Force Commander: Robert. Rear Admiral English

7.1 Battalion

Nautilus SS-168 W.h. Jr. Major Brockman of the Navy

Dolphin SS-169 (R.L.) Lieutenant Commander Rutter

Sperm whale SS-170 ) G.A. Lieutenant Commander Lewis

Cuttlefish SS-171 ) M.P. Lieutenant Commander Hotell

Grouper SS-214 (C.E. Lieutenant Commander Duke

Flying fish SS-229 ) G.R. Lieutenant Commander Donahoe

Puffer fish SS-198 ) J.W. Lieutenant Commander Murphy

Trout number SS-202 (F.W.) Lieutenant Commander Finno

trout SS-209 ) E. Lieutenant Commander Olson

Hake SS-210 (W.A.) Lieutenant Commander Lunt

aspen SS-211 ) H.B. Lieutenant Commander Leon

The Little Shark SS-212 (W.G.) Lieutenant Commander Miles

72nd Battalion

The Narwhal SS-167 (C.W. Lieutenant Commander Wilkins

Piston number SS-179 D.C. Lieutenant Commander White

Trigger number SS-237 ) J.H. Lieutenant Commander Lewis

The 73rd Battalion

Barracuda SS-173 (W.A.) Lieutenant commander New York

Tarpon SS-175 ) Lewis. Lieutenant Commander Wallace

Fin Whale SS-230 ) J.L. Lieutenant commander Hull

Growler SS-215 ) H.W. Lieutenant Commander Gilmore

Japan

Isoroku Yamamoto (Commander, Japan Combined Fleet)

Campaign Commander: Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, commander in chief of the Combined Fleet

First, the main formation: Commander Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku

One aircraft carrier, two seaplane carriers, 19 carrier-based aircraft, 50 seaplanes, 7 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 21 destroyers, and 4 supply ships

(A) Battleship forces: (First battleship Squadron) Commander Yamamoto Isoroku

Battleships Yamato, Nagato, and Luo

(2) Aircraft carrier forces: Commander Admiral Kaoru Umetani

Fengxiang aircraft carrier and Xifeng destroyer, with 19 carrier-based aircraft

(3) Seaplane carrier forces: Commander Admiral Harada Kyaw

Chiyoda, Rijin seaplane aircraft carrier, 50 seaplanes

(4) Alert Force: (Third Destroyer Squadron) Commander Rear Admiral Shintaro Hashimoto

1. Kawauchi light cruiser

2. Admiral Shoji Kiichiro, commander of the 11th Destroyer Detachment

Blowing snow, Snow, Early snow, Cong Yun destroyer

3. Admiral Hiroji Oe, commander of the 19th Destroyer Detachment

The destroyers Iso Wave, Urata Wave, Shiki Wave, Ayanami Wave

The main aircraft carrier of the Imperial Japanese Navy (2 photos)

(V) The First Supply Force: Commander Nishioka Shitai Navy

Naruto, Toei Maru tanker

(vi) Aleutian Guard Forces: Commander Vice Admiral Shiro Takasu, Commander of the First Fleet

1. Battleship Force: (II Battleship Group) Commander Vice Admiral Shiro Takasu

Higashi, Ise, Fuso, Yamashiro battleships

2. Guard Force: Commander Rear Admiral Fukuji Kishi

1. Ninth (Light) Cruiser Group: Commander Rear Admiral Fukuji Kishi

Kitagami, Oi light cruiser

2. Destroyer Detachment 20: Commander Yamada Yuo Second Navy Senior Commander

Asaku, Evening fog, White Cloud, Sky fog destroyer

3. Destroyer Detachment 24: Commander Taiji Hirai

Sea Breeze, Mountain wind, River wind, Cool wind destroyers

4. Destroyer Detachment XXVII: Commander Matakeo Yoshimura

The destroyers Ariaki, Xitwilight, Shiyu, and White Dew

5. Second Supply Force: Commander Eguchi Matsuo

SAN Clementi Maru, East Asia Maru tanker

Second, mobile formation: (First Air Fleet) commander Admiral Nakayoshi

Four aircraft carriers, 266 aircraft, two battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, 12 destroyers, and five supply ships

(I) Aircraft Carrier Force: Commander Admiral Tadaichi Minamumo

1. First aircraft Carrier Group: Commander Admiral Tadaichi Nagamumo

Akagi and Kaga aircraft carriers with 146 aircraft on board

2. Second aircraft Carrier Group: Commander Rear Admiral Yamaguchi Takashi

Canglong, Flying Dragon aircraft carrier, 126 aircraft

(II) Supporting forces: Commander Rear Admiral Hiroyi Abe

1. 8th (heavy) Cruiser Squadron: Commander Rear Admiral Hiroshi Abe

The heavy cruisers Ligan and Tsukiyama

2. Third Battleship Squadron, Second Team: Commander Takamama

Battleships Haruna and Kirishima

(3) Alert Force: (Destroyer Squadron 10) Commander Rear Admiral Jin Kimura

1. The light cruiser Nagara

2. Destroyer Detachment 4: Commander Ariga Koshusaku

The destroyers Noko, Arashi, Hagi Wind, and Maikaze

3. Destroyer Detachment 10: Commander Admiral Toshio Abe

Destroyer Fengyun, Xiyun, Cirrus Cloud

4. Destroyer Detachment 17: Commander Masayuki Kitamura

Urawae, Isokaze, Tanawae, Hamakaze destroyers

(4) Supply forces: Commander Odo Upright Navy Grand Commander

Kotoku Maru, Shinkuni Maru, Tobun Maru, Nihon Maru, Kuniyo Maru tanker

The destroyer Autumn Cloud

Iii. Midway Landing Formation: Vice Admiral Nobutaku Kondo, Commander of the Second Fleet

One aircraft carrier, two seaplane carriers, 23 carrier-based aircraft, 40 seaplanes, two battleships, eight heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, 21 destroyers, 14 transport ships, and eight supply ships

(I) Main force: Commander Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo

1. Fourth (heavy) Cruiser Group: Commander Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo

Atago, Torikai heavy cruiser

2. 5th (heavy) Cruiser Squadron: Commander Vice Admiral Takeo Takagi

Myoko, Haguro heavy cruiser

3. The first Squad of the Third Battleship Squadron: Commander, a Vice Admiral of the Mikawa Army

The King Kong, the battleship Beary

(2) Alert Force: (Fourth Destroyer Squadron) Commander Rear Admiral Shoji Nishimura

1. The light cruiser Yura

2. Second Destroyer Detachment: Commander Masao Tachika

Village Rain, May Rain, Spring Rain, Xi Li destroyers

3. Destroyer Squad 9: Commander Admiral Yasuo Sato

Chaoyun, Fengyun, Xia Yun destroyers

(3) Aircraft carrier Force: Commander Omiao Obayashi Navy Grand Commander

Ruifeng light aircraft carrier, three moon destroyer, carrier-borne aircraft 23

(IV) Close Support Force: Commander Vice Admiral Keno Kurita

1. 7th (Heavy) Cruiser Group: Commander Vice Admiral Keno Kurita

Kumano, Susutani, Mitsukuma, Kamikami heavy cruiser

2. Destroyer Detachment 8: Commander Fyona Ogawa Navy Commander

Asaho, Araho destroyer, Nisei Maru oil tanker

(V) Transport ship Regiment: Commander Rear Admiral Tanaka Reizo

Wuzhou Maru, Quan Yang Maru, Second East Asia Maru, Argentina Maru, Brazil Maru, My wife Maru, Keiyang Maru, Wuzhou Maru, Kano Maru, Hokuriku Maru, Kirishima Maru, Nanhai Maru transport ship

Patrol boats No. 1, No. 2, No. 34, oil tanker Shu Maru

(Carrying the Second Joint Special Marine Corps under the direct command of Minoru Ota and the Army Ichiki Detachment under the direct command of Army Daisao Ichiki, a total of about 5,800 men)

(6) Escort Force: (Second Destroyer Squadron) Commander Rear Admiral Tanaka Reizo

1. The light cruiser Avatar

2. Destroyer Detachment 15: Commander Shiro Sato

Destroyers Kuroshio and Kinshio

3. Destroyer Detachment 16: Commander Shibuya Jiro

Xue Feng, Tianjin Wind, Shijin Wind, Chu Feng destroyers

4. Destroyer Detachment 18: Commander Admiral Yoshidon Miyazaka

I don't know fire, Xia, Graupel, Yang Yan destroyer

(VII) Seaplane Carrier Force: (11th Air Force) Commander Rear Admiral Fujita Kotaro

Chitose, Kamikawa Maru seaplane carrier

Destroyer Morning Tide, patrol boat 35

(8) Minesweeping forces: Commander Ben Dingzhi Navy Senior Commander

Third jade Maru, fifth jade Maru, seventh Shonan Maru, eighth Shonan Maru minesweeper

Submarines 16, 17, 18

Soya supply ship, Ming Yang Maru, Yamfuku Maru transport ship

(9) Supply forces: Commander Jiro Tree Tail Navy

Sado, Tsurumi, Genyo Maru, Kenyo Maru, Akashi repair ship

Fourth, the Northern Formation: (Fifth Fleet) commander Vice Admiral Hososuka Shuko

Two aircraft carriers, carrying 82 carrier-based aircraft, one seaplane carrier, 10 seaplanes, 3 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, 12 destroyers, 6 submarines, 5 minesweepers, 3 transport ships, 3 supply ships

(1) Main force: Commander Vice Admiral Hososuka Shuko

Wakamiya seaplane carrier, Nazhi heavy cruiser, Electric, Thunder destroyer, Fujiyama Maru, Niyama Maru oil tanker

(II) Mobile Force II: Rear Admiral Kyoji Kakuta, Commander

1. Aircraft Carrier Force: (Fourth Aircraft Carrier Group) Commander Rear Admiral Kyoji Kakuta

Longchamp and Falcon, with 82 aircraft on board

2. Supporting Force: (4th [heavy] Cruiser Squadron, 2nd Team) Commander Admiral Shusaku Kokujima

The heavy cruisers Moye and Kaohsiung

3. Alert Force: (7th Destroyer Detachment) Commander Konishi VIP Navy

Eosu, Shio, destroyer Saami, oil tanker Taiyang Maru

(III) Attu Island Invasion forces: Commander Rear Admiral Ohori Sentai

1. Abukuma light cruiser

2. The 21st Destroyer Detachment: Commander Admiral Qing Shuifu

Wakaba, Ziri, Chutchun, Chutsu, mineship Zhenjin Maru

Transport ship Ikasa Maru (carrying the Army North Sea Detachment of the Attu Island Landing Force under the command of Hoiji Matsumoto Army, a total of 1,200 personnel)

(4) Kiska Island Raiding Force: (21st [light] cruiser Squadron) Commander Ohno Takeji

1. 21st (Light) Cruiser Squadron: Commander Ohno Takeji

Kizo, Tama light cruiser, Asaka Maru auxiliary cruiser

2. Alert Force: (Destroyer Unit 6) Commander Yamada Yosuke

The destroyers Ring, Xiao and Fan Wind

3. Transport fleet:

Transport ship Hakusan Maru (carrying the landing force on Kiska Island, 3rd Special Marine Corps of Maizuru Town)

Komogawa Maru Carrier (carrying construction materials and 700 workers)

4. The 13th minesweeper detachment: Commander Admiral Toshio Mitsuka

Fast phoenix pill, Junwagtail pill, white phoenix pill minesweeper

(V) Submarine Force: (First Submarine Squadron) Commander Rear Admiral Shigeki Yamazaki

1. Submarine I-9

2. Submarine Division II: Commander Admiral Hiroshi Imari

I-15, I-17, I-19 submarines

3. Fourth Submarine Detachment: Commander Nagai Mitsuki

I-25, I-26 submarines

V. Advance formation: (Sixth Fleet) Commander Vice Admiral Tomihisa Komatsu

One light cruiser, one submarine supply ship, and 17 submarines

(1) Katori Light cruiser

(II) Third Submarine Squadron: Commander Rear Admiral Kono Chimanjo

1. Rio Maru submarine supply ship

2. The 19th Submarine Division: Commander Ryojiro Ono Navy Nakaso

Submarine No. 156, No. 157, No. 158, No. 159 3, Submarine Division 30: Commander Masao Teraoka

Submarines I-162, I-165, I-166

4. Submarine Unit 13: Commander Admiral Miyazaki Takeharu

Submarines I-12L, I-122, I-123

(3) The Fifth Submarine Team:

1. Submarine Squad 11:

Submarines I-173, I-174, I-175

2. Submarine Detachment 12:

Submarines I-168, I-169, I-171, I-172

6. Vice Admiral Tsukahara, Commander of the Shore-based Aviation Forces (11th Air Fleet)

There were 214 shore-based aircraft, 46 of which were carried by carriers in mobile formations

(1) Midway Island dispatched air force: Commander Morita Senli Navy

There are 36 Zero fighters, 10 land bombers and 6 seaplanes

(Fighters and bombers carried by mobile formation of carriers, planned to transfer directly to Midway Island)

(II) Rear Admiral Minoru Maeda, Commander of the 24th Air Force (4th Air Raid Force)

1. Chitose Air Force: Commander Fujiro Ohashi

36 Zero fighters, 36 torpedo bombers

2. First Air Force: Commander Inoue Satsuma II

36 Zero fighters, 36 torpedo bombers

3. 14th Air Force: Commander 3rd Grand Commander Nakajima

18 seaplanes

Casualties on both sides

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EDITOR

United States: 1 aircraft carrier (" Uss Yorktown One destroyer (Harman), 147 aircraft (mostly shot down), and 307 killed.

Japan: 4 aircraft carriers (" Akagi "Kaga", "Soryu", "Flying Dragon"), one heavy cruiser (" Mikuma "), 332 aircraft (including spare aircraft, about 280 were blown up on the carrier, only 52 were shot down), 3,057 killed. ^[1]

Post-war analysis

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EDITOR

Causes of Japanese defeat

1. The Japanese Navy is arrogant and arrogant. Pride comes before a fall, which is the true portrayal of the Japanese Navy in this naval battle, and also the fundamental reason for the defeat of the Japanese Navy in this naval battle. In the initial stages of the war, the Japanese Navy performed well, especially the attack on Pearl Harbor, which was well planned, well prepared, and accurate, and achieved unexpected and brilliant results. However, because this stage was too smooth, the Japanese navy was dizzy with victory. In this naval battle, the conscientious attitude of the beginning of the war was missing. The battle plan was hastily drawn up, full of loopholes, and ignored opposition. The graphic exercises that tested the battle plan were also perfunctory. For example, during the exercise Nagumo Forces were attacked by American land-based aircraft during an air raid on Midway Island, and the judges ruled that the Japanese fleet was hit nine times and two aircraft carriers were sunk. Major General Utagaki, who was in charge of the exercise, ordered the number of hits to be changed to three, with one carrier being sunk and the other slightly injured, but the sunk carrier soon rose from the bottom of the sea to take part in the next phase of the campaign. The officers and soldiers of the First Mobile Force of Lt. Gen. Tadaichi Nagamo of Japan also held the attitude of "no matter what task we can complete" and did not prepare seriously for the battle. The arrogance of the entire Japanese Navy was also the root cause of a series of mistakes that led to the defeat of the Japanese Navy.

2. Failure of the intelligence war. At that time, the war had developed into a multi-dimensional space, and intelligence and information warfare had become one of the main factors restricting the victory of the war. The American victory in this naval battle was to break the Japanese navy's code in advance, and to understand the Japanese Navy's battle plan and combat deployment before the outbreak of the battle. So we can focus on ambushing the Japanese. Lieutenant Colonel Layton, who was in charge of the code breaking at the time, predicted to the headquarters: "The Japanese mobile fleet will come from the northwest, 325 degrees, and will be detected 175 nautical miles off Midway, at 6:00 Midway time." After spotting the Japanese fleet at exactly the right time, Nimitz said to Lt. Col. Layton, "Congratulations, you missed your forecast by only five nautical miles." The Japanese, on the other hand, had not gathered any valuable intelligence before the war, and their planned reconnaissance operations had been cancelled for various reasons. So he made a completely wrong judgment about the enemy. The two sides have a light and a dark, so that the United States enjoy the advantage of the first opportunity.

3. Mistakes in Japanese battle planning. First, Japan made the mistake of dispersing its forces. Despite the large number of Japanese ships, they were divided into six groups that could not directly support each other, and two aircraft carriers were deployed far to the north, leaving the four aircraft carriers of the Nagumo Fleet, which had a total of 261 aircraft on board, in the direction of Midway Island. However, the U.S. Navy concentrated its forces to the maximum extent possible, and the total number of aircraft that could be used in the direction of Midway Island reached 354, which was an advantage in numbers. Second. The tasks given to the Nagumo fleet are two fundamentally contradictory tasks. One mission was an air raid on Midway Island to prepare fire for a landing operation. This severely restricted the Nagumo fleet's freedom of movement. The other task, however, was to make contact with the enemy fleet and destroy it, which in turn required the Nagumo fleet to be fully mobile according to the situation. As no priority was specified, Nagumo's fleet was at a loss. Forced to load ammunition to complete different tasks on two waves of the aircraft, and later because of the replacement of ammunition delayed the time, delayed the aircraft, suffered a disaster. Third, we did not pay attention to intelligence work and the means of gathering intelligence, so that we did not correctly identify the enemy situation.

4. Japan's backward concept of warfare. The sinking of all the battleships at Pearl Harbor allowed the Americans to loose their hands and build a task force centered on the aircraft carrier, with the rest of the ships surrounding the aircraft carrier. Although Japan used carrier-based aircraft to achieve the victory of the attack on Pearl Harbor, there are still many people in the navy who insist on using battleships as the decisive force in the naval battle, including the world's largest battleship "Yamato" and other battleships were kept in the column Island anchorage for the future decisive battle. They played no more of a role than the American battleships sunk at Pearl Harbor. The Japanese Navy was reluctant to combine battleships and aircraft carriers into a carrier-centered fleet, allowing the battleships to provide air cover for the aircraft carriers, leaving the Nagumo fleet to rely on its own patrol aircraft to protect itself. When attacked by Midway aircraft, the Japanese fleet had to take off the second wave of aircraft in the cover fighter, resulting in the intelligence of the American fleet has been prepared after the dive bombers without fighter cover, Nagumo witnessed the failure of the American fighter planes without fighter cover, unwilling to repeat the mistake, decided to reorganize the troops and then attack the American fleet. Causing the aircraft to be delayed. In addition, the task of preparing the fire for the landing operation could be left to the battleships, which would free the hands of the Nagumo fleet.

5. Errors in operational command. The first is the neglect of the reconnaissance mission. The Nagumo Fleet did not have a dedicated reconnaissance fleet, and because it did not want to spread out its offensive, the fleet's reconnaissance duties were mainly performed by the older seaplanes on the battleships and cruisers in the formation. That day, the Japanese fleet did not conduct a dual-phase search, and two of the single-phase search aircraft broke down, delaying takeoff time, causing a delay in the detection of the American fleet, which directly affected the battle. Second, when Nagumo received intelligence from the American fleet, he did not take Yamaguchi's well-heard advice and immediately attacked with dive bombers covered by all fighter jets, resulting in the sinking of both ships and aircraft. Third, General Yamamoto himself led the battleships into battle and voluntarily gave up the direction of the campaign in order to maintain radio silence.

6. Differences in scientific, technological and industrial economic strength between the two countries. Japan lags behind the United States in science and technology, an obvious proof of which is the application of radar technology. The American fleet was already equipped with radar to detect and prepare for the absence of the Japanese fleet, while the Japanese fleet was not equipped with radar, all warnings were based on visual observation, and when the American dive bombers attacked under the cover of clouds, they were unable to react in time. The industrial economic strength of both sides also played a big role. Midway was preceded by the Battle of the Coral Sea, in which the Japanese aircraft carrier Shingo Tsuru was injured and required a month of repair work, and Shingo Tsuru was unable to perform combat duties due to heavy personnel losses. The American aircraft carrier Lexington was sunk and the Yorktown was injured. In order to allow the "Yorktown" to participate in the Battle of Midway Island, the United States concentrated on the "Yorktown" for three days and three nights of repair, and finally made it back on the battlefield, and made great contributions to the victory. The two sides can compare the level here, Japan reduced 2 aircraft carriers, the United States has increased 1, the comparison of the two aircraft carriers into 4:3, greatly reducing the gap between the two sides, and laying a solid foundation for the United States to win.

Significance of a campaign

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EDITOR

The Americans lost only one ship in the Battle of Midway Aircraft carrier , 1 ship destroyer And 147 aircraft, 307 killed; Japan lost four large aircraft carriers, a cruiser, 332 aircraft, hundreds of experienced pilots and 3,700 crew. The Japanese navy was defeated. To disguise its defeat and avoid demoralizing its troops, on June 10th Japanese radio broadcast a blaring navy song declaring that Japan had "become the most powerful nation in the Pacific." When the defeated fleet returned home exhausted, Tokyo held a lantern parade to celebrate the victory. The head of the U.S. Navy later commented, The Battle of Midway was the first decisive defeat of the Japanese Navy in 350 years. It ended the long Japanese offensive and restored the balance of naval power in the Pacific." At the same time, the battle also caused a difficult wound to the Japanese senior leadership, the bitter memories of this until the end of the war, so that they can no longer make a clear judgment of the war.

The famous American naval historian Samuel E. Morrison The victory of the United States Navy in the Battle of Midway is called an "intelligence victory." The U.S. Navy's early detection of the Japanese Navy's plans was one of the main reasons for the Japanese navy's defeat. Morrison also argued that the fact that the Japanese anti-aircraft guns did not prevent a single bomber from dropping bombs at Midway, and that the anti-aircraft guns only caused a few American aircraft to be lost at the Battle of Mariana, should not be too much expected of the role of battleships in air defense. The American anti-aircraft guns were not effective until they were replaced with the powerful Bofors 40 mm and equipped with proximity fuzes. Both Japan and the United States were engaged in battleship building competitions before the war.

The most obvious failure of the Japanese naval plan was the spread of forces, with the combined fleet units operating separately at great distances, while the US Navy concentrated its forces to the maximum. The advantage of the combined fleet was diminished. Another mistake in the Japanese plan was that the attack on Midway was intended to tempt the enemy fleet into a decisive battle, but instead the aircraft carriers were set up to support the occupation of Midway, in the wishful belief that the enemy fleet would not leave its base until Midway was attacked. The Japanese reconnaissance and search plan was equally unfavorable. Finally lead to southern cloud encountered a dilemma and back and forth change of torpedoes, bombs awkward situation.

The Battle of Midway changed the balance of Japanese and American aircraft carrier power in the Pacific. The Japanese left only two large aircraft carriers and four light aircraft carriers. Since then, Japan has been in Pacific Theater Start to lose Strategic initiative The battle situation is favorable Allied forces The turning point. This naval battle is characterized by the two sides of the sea battle formation outside the range of the ship's guns, with the carrier aviation to carry out assault. The Japanese failed because they overestimated the effectiveness of their aircraft carriers, fought in two directions at the same time, and their forces were scattered. Misjudged the situation, believing that the US aircraft carrier was too late to converge on the theater; Backward communication technology, lack of thorough maritime reconnaissance, until the critical moment did not identify the location of the US aircraft carrier; The battlefield was poorly commanded and the determination varied. The reason for the victory of the American army is to grasp the Japanese attack attempt and gather forces in time to wait; In the case of the loss of most of the torpedo planes, the bombers continued to dive bombing, causing the Japanese torpedo planes and mines to explode, and the aircraft carrier was completely destroyed. ^[1]

War dispute

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EDITOR

Five minutes of destiny

After three hours of fierce fighting, the Japanese defensive barrier seemed to prove impenetrable, so the Japanese changed the mission of 93 bombers and torpedo planes. But at 10:22 a.m., the impenetrable defensive barrier finally opened a breach. The "Flying Dragon" aircraft carrier suddenly broke out of the box formation and sailed north; But the other three carriers remained locked in a group and fought back at the takeoff point. Their flight decks became an invitation to catastrophe: a group of pilots excitedly cranking up their engines, piles of bombs in disarray, officers and soldiers running nervously, high-octane oil hoses snaking around their feet. It will only take five minutes to strike and be ready to take out the American carrier.

"Zero" aircraft are flying at low altitude in pursuit of low flying American torpedo planes. This left Japanese carriers short of fighter patrol cover against high-altitude attacks. At that moment, 36 Intrepid dive bombers led by Lieutenant Commander Wilder McCluskey from the USS Enterprise and Lieutenant Commander Maxwell Leslie from the USS Yorktown suddenly burst out of the clouds with a chilling scream, They attacked 17 dive bombers taking off from the Japanese carrier below. In many later films, this statement and plot are used but the actual situation is different. ^[3]

The non-existent "5 Minutes of Destiny"

The "Battle of Midway Island" published by Japanese Asacloud Publishing House has fundamentally denied the statement of "5 minutes of fate".

"At the time the Nagumo fleet was hit, the changeover (bomb for torpedo) had not yet been completed and the attack team was preparing to take off, and while it is widely believed that the first fighter was hit as it slid off the deck, it is certain that the fighter belonged to the fleet direct mask and not to the escort aircraft of the attack fleet against the U.S. Task Force."

According to the testimony of the lookout on the bridge of Akagi, at the moment of being shot, there was not a single attack aircraft on the flight deck of Akagi. There are only three Zeros. One of them appears to be a cover plane for Attack Group 2, but it is impossible to determine. Most of the fighter escorts for Strike Group 2 were flying overhead to cover the fleet. The other two, we can say, belong to the thrusters that just landed to refuel their ammunition.

According to the pilot testimony, a zero fighter that took off at that time, because its pilot found the US military aircraft that was diving down, and immediately jumped on the plane in front of the takeoff. It can be confirmed that before Akagi was shot, there were only three zeros on deck, and none of them had pilots. The 97th attack pilot of Strike Team 2 is waiting in the standby room for takeoff.

In fact, the casualties of Akagi and other aircraft carrier pilots were not large, which also confirms that they should not have been in the cockpit of the aircraft, because if they were in the cockpit of the aircraft neatly arranged on the deck, after being shot, the aircraft detonated in a very short time would have killed a large number of their pilots.

It is not known whether the deck of the Kaga carrier was lined up with the aircraft of the Second Strike Group at the moment of the attack, but there is testimony that the ship 97 was shot while on the elevator.

At the moment when the dragon was shot, there was testimony that "about 10 ships attacked on the deck". It could have been a returning ship attack from Strike Group 1 that had just landed, or a "99 dive bomber" for Strike Group 2. Either way, it doesn't prove Strike Team 2 is five minutes away from takeoff.

Furthermore, if the first and second aircrafts were shot in the "five minutes of fate", then the unshot Dragon should have taken off all Strike Group 2 fighters within five minutes. But in fact, the Dragon 2 strike team began to take off 30 minutes after all three carriers were hit. This shows that at least the dragon is definitely not five minutes away from launching its attack team.

At least one conclusion can be drawn - when the three aircraft carriers are shot, the takeoff of the second attack team of Soryu and Feiyu will take at least 30 minutes, while Akagi and Kaga will need more time.

According to Lt. koto Akagi's testimony, "In five minutes, maybe five minutes, the attack aircraft in the hangar will finish their bomb-for-torpedo work, and then the aircraft will be raised to the deck by elevator, lined up in the takeoff position, completed the test run, and then take off, which will take at least 30 minutes."

At that time, the second Aviation Officer of the First Air Fleet (the first staff officer was Minada Kosa) answered the questions of the post-war committee, saying, "The five minutes of fate are nonsense."

Even if there is a "30 minutes of destiny" or a "60 minutes of destiny," there is absolutely no "5 minutes of destiny." This is probably the unique way of thinking of the Japanese people, "five minutes of fate" means the projection of the Japanese people's subjective wish that "we could have won", "just a little bit of bad luck".

Some of the Japanese have repeatedly argued for the "five minutes of destiny," but the commission has investigated their positions at the Battle of Midway and their answers to questions about whether they witnessed it. In fact, their positions and their answers to whether they witnessed it determined that they could not support the "five minutes of destiny."

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